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O nline sports betting is a popular recreational activity in Nigeria. Like other forms of gambling, risk of pathologicalprogression exists for gamblers who continue betting despite severe financial and psychosocial consequences. In the
present study, we examined whether this population of gamblers shows deficits in decision making and cognitive flexibility
that have been documented in Western gambling populations. Thirty-six online sports bettors and 42 non-gambling
participants completed a version of the Iowa gambling task (IGT) and an established set-shifting task for the assessment
of cognitive flexibility. The two groups did not differ significantly in the selection of disadvantageous decks on the IGT. In
contrast, sports bettors committed significantly more errors on the set-shifting task than non-gambling control participants.
As this performance deficit was not specific to trials requiring a set shift, it most likely resulted from gambling-related
changes in general cognitive or motivational abilities that are required to successfully complete challenging mental tasks.
While our results illustrate that findings from Western populations cannot automatically be generalised to other contexts,
it should be noted that we focused on only one particular type of gambling and included mostly participants with mild
gambling-related problems.
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Gambling is an ubiquitous activity among adolescents
and young adults across the globe (Vigna-Taglianti et al.,
2017). Gambling activities can become problematic when
being continued despite serious adverse economic and
psychosocial consequences (e.g., Armstrong & Carroll,
2017). Identifying risk factors for and mechanisms under-
lying problematic gambling behaviour is important to
anticipate and mitigate these consequences. One line
of research on the determinants of problem gambling
focuses on impairments in cognitive processes on the part
of the gambler. Such impairments are often examined by
means of laboratory decision-making tasks and tests of
cognitive flexibility.
A popular paradigm for the assessment of decision
making under uncertainty is the Iowa gambling task (IGT;
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In the
IGT, participants are allowed to sample cards from four
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decks, which are associated with a given reward and
punishment structure. Some of the decks are advanta-
geous, while some are disadvantageous. The selection
from the disadvantageous decks is associated with a neg-
ative expected value as it offers occasional large wins but
also the possibility to incur even larger losses. Select-
ing cards from the advantageous deck, on the other hand,
relates to smaller wins and losses and a positive expected
value. Performance in this task requires that participants
deal with this uncertainty in the context of the reward
and punishment structure, as they gradually learn over
the trials which decks offer more rewards than punish-
ment in the long term. While early studies showed that
patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (Bechara et al., 1994) and substance use disorders
(Bornovalova, Lejuez, Daughters, Zachary Rosenthal, &
Lynch, 2005) are impaired in the IGT, recent evidence
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has also identified pathological gamblers as a popula-
tion encountering problems with making advantageous
choices on the task (Brevers et al., 2012; Ledgerwood
et al., 2011). In the IGT, pathological gamblers have an
abnormal preference for the risky choice of disadvan-
tageous decks, which offer short term rewards but long
term punishment (Bechara, 2003). The inability to decide
advantageously against the background of this reward
structure may relate to alterations in limbic-striatal net-
works involved in the processing of rewards (Everitt
& Robbins, 2005) or prefrontal cortical changes affect-
ing the control of gambling impulses (Zelazo & Muller,
2002).
Other research on the cognitive underpinnings of
problematic gambling behaviour has focused on the
domain of cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility
refers to the ability to shift cognitive sets or strategies
(Miyake et al., 2000) and has traditionally been studied
with neuropsychological tests such as the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, Chelume, Talley,
Kay, & Curtiss, 1993). Patients with gambling disorder
have been reported to show more perseverative behaviour
on this test (van Timmeren, Daams, van Holst, & Goudri-
aan, 2018), that is, they tend to stick to one course of
action despite having received negative feedback. Similar
patterns have been observed in patients with prefrontal
lesions (Demakis, 2003) or Parkinson’s disease (Lange,
Brückner, Knebel, Seer, & Kopp, 2018), thus contributing
to the view that cognitive flexibility relies on the integrity
of the prefrontal cortex and its connections with the basal
ganglia (Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2007). It is important
to note, however, that the WCST is not a pure task of
cognitive flexibility as it involves additional cognitive
processes that complicate the interpretation of WCST
performance deficits (Lange, Seer, & Kopp, 2017). Sim-
plified set-shifting or task-switching paradigms (Kesiel
et al., 2010) have been developed as more process-pure
measures of cognitive flexibility (see Lange et al., 2018,
for an analysis of the differences between the WCST
and task-switching paradigms). Such paradigms require
participants to repeat a cognitive task (e.g., classifying
stimuli according to their colour) on some trials and to
switch to another task (e.g., classifying stimuli accord-
ing to their shape) on others. Little is known about the
performance of problematic gamblers on such tasks of
cognitive flexibility. The only study we are aware of
did not reveal differences in task-switching performance
between pathological gamblers and healthy controls (van
Timmeren, Jansen, Caan, Goudriaan, & van Holst, 2016).
An important limitation of previous studies on the cog-
nitive correlates of problematic gambling is their almost
exclusive focus on gamblers from Western populations.
Cultural differences can influence the initiation and main-
tenance of gambling in multiple ways (Raylu & Oei,
2004), implying that findings cannot automatically be
generalised from one culture to another. The present study
TABLE 1
Demographic information of healthy controls and gamblers
Controls Gamblers
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
N 42 36a
Age 22.24 (3.97) 22.69 (3.64)
Gender: Male/Female 36/6 33/2
Education (Years) 12.29 (1.69) 12.69 (1.53)
BIS 14.43 (3.44) 13.83 (3.19)
G-SAS - 16.57 (9.69)
Number of years gambled - 2.36 (1.28)
Age of onset - 20.34 (3.89)
Real life net profit (Naira) - 1060 (1395.15)
N = Number of participants; BIS = Barratt impulsiveness scale;
G-SAS = Gambling symptoms assessment scale; SD = standard
deviation.
aMissing demographics for one participant.
aims to probe the generalizability of previous findings by
examining gambling-related deficits in decision-making
and cognitive flexibility in a Nigerian sample. A popular
form of gambling in Nigeria is sports betting with 34%
of the young population reporting to place bets on sports
event regularly (NOIPolls). A particular appeal of this
type of gambling is the possibility to place bets online,
during an ongoing sports competition, which reduces the
waiting time between a bet and the outcome (Russell,
Hing, & Browne, 2019). To test whether young Nigeri-
ans who regularly engage in online sports betting have
difficulties making decisions under uncertainty or shift-
ing cognitive sets, we will compare their performance on
the IGT and on an established task-switching paradigm
task to the performance of non-gamblers.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 78 participants took part in the study. The
sample consisted of 36 individuals who reported to
regularly engage in online sports betting (referred to as
gamblers in the following) and 42 control participants
who reported not to do so (Table 1). Demographic and
IGT data were lost for one participant in the gambling
group. Data of this participant were only included in the
analysis of task-switching performance. Most gamblers
were recruited from naijabet shops, the predominant
online sports trading industry in Nigeria, while the
remaining gamblers were recruited from University of
Nigeria, Nsukka, where all the control participants were
recruited as well. Participants who were below 18 years
and above 35 years were excluded from the study, as well
as those who did not have basic knowledge in English
language. This is to ensure that all participants in both
groups were able to understand the task instructions
written in English. Other exclusion criteria which were
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orally screened were history of neurological disorders,
head injuries or seizures. The study was approved by the
Psychology departmental review board of University of
Nigeria, Nsukka.
Procedures and assessment
Testing was done in a conducive room within the premises
of the naijabet shops in Enugu state, Nigeria or at the
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, where the healthy controls
were recruited. Participants consented to take part in the
study by signing a form that described the purpose of the
study and the expectation from the participants. They pro-
vided demographic information, filled in two self-report
scales described below for clinical background assess-
ment, and completed two computerised tasks presented
on an 14inch laptop for the assessment of decision making
and cognitive flexibility.
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS)
Impulsiveness was examined with a brief and uni-
dimensional version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS; Steinberg, Sharp, Stanford, & Tharp, 2013).
Example items include “I do things without think-
ing” and “I am a careful thinker” (reverse coded).
Each of the eight items was completed on a four-point
scale (1 = rarely/never; 2 = occasionally; 3 = often;
4 = almost always/always). Internal consistency of the
scale was lower (α = 0.54) in the present study than in the
original report by Steinberg and colleagues (α = 0.78).
BIS results should thus be interpreted with caution.
The Gambling Symptom Assessment Scale
(G-SAS)
Participants in the gambling group completed
the Gambling Symptom Assessment Scale (G-SAS;
Kim, Grant, Potenza, Blanco, & Hollander, 2009), a
12-item questionnaire that measures gambling-symptom
severity during the past 7 days. Participants reported
gambling-related urges, thoughts, feelings and behaviours
on a 0–4 scaling format. Maximum possible score was 48
points with the following individual score categorization:
extreme = 41–48; severe = 40–31; moderate = 30–21;
mild = 8–20. Kim and colleagues reported that the inter-
nal consistency of the G-SAS is α = 0.89 (current study:
α = 0.93).
Iowa gambling task
A computerised version of the IGT (Mueller & Piper,
2014) was used to assess risky decision making. Partic-
ipants were presented with four similar decks that were
differentially labelled A, B, C and D. They received stan-
dardised instructions informing them to choose a deck at
every trial and to maximise their overall score. Choosing a
deck resulted in a probabilistically determined number of
points added to or subtracted from the participant’s score.
Two of the decks (A, B) were disadvantageous, in that
they offered immediate gains but occasional huge losses
resulting in an overall negative expected value. The other
two decks (C, D) were advantageous because they pro-
vided small gains and small losses, leading to an overall
positive outcome. Participants were informed to earn as
much money as possible while freely switching between
decks. The total number of trials was 100, divided into 5
blocks of 20 trials each. Performance was measured by the
number of risky decks chosen at each block. Participants’
overall task score served as a secondary outcome.
The colour-shape-shifting task
The colour-shape shifting task has frequently been
used to assess cognitive set-shifting (Friedman et al.,
2016). In designing the task for the current study
(using OpenSesame version 3.1.4; Mathôt, Schreij, &
Theeuwes, 2012), we closely followed the description
provided by Ito et al. (2015). On the task, participants
were required to classify stimuli presented on a computer
screen according to one of two rules: colour or shape.
Target stimuli were circles or triangles in either red or
green colour. Target stimuli were preceded by a cue (pre-
sented above the target position) indicating the sorting
rule to be applied on the current trial (“C” for colour,
“S” for shape). Cue display started 350 ms before target
display and ended with participants’ keyboard response.
Participants received a negative feedback sound (200 ms,
440 Hz) after incorrect responses.
The task started with two single task blocks, each con-
sisting of 24 trials preceded by 12 practice trials and
2 warm-up trials (excluded from analyses). In the first
single-task block, participants had to apply the colour
rule: They were instructed to press “z” with the left index
finger whenever a red stimulus appeared but to press
“/” whenever a green stimulus appeared. In the second
single-task block, participants had to apply the shape rule:
they were instructed to press “z” whenever a circle was
presented and to press “/” whenever a triangle appeared.
Participants then practiced switching between the two
rules (24 trials) before completing two mixed-task blocks
(56 trials plus 4 warm-up trials each). The sequence
of trials within these mixed-task blocks was pseudoran-
domised to ensure that (a) the colour rule and the shape
rule had to be applied equally often and (b) switch tri-
als (trials with a cue that differs from the cue of the
previous trial) and repeat trials (trials with a cue that
matches the cue from the previous trial) occurred with
equal frequency. Error rates and mean response times
© 2020 The Authors. International Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of International Union of Psychological Science.
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were analysed separately for switch trials and repeat trials
in mixed blocks as well as for repeat trials in single-task
blocks. For the calculation of response times, we excluded
responses on or following incorrect trials, responses faster
than 200 ms, and response times more than three standard
deviations above a participant’s mean response time.
Statistical analyses
Mixed-factor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with
Greenhouse–Geisser correction were used to examine
potential group differences in performance on the IGT
and the colour-shape-shifting task. In addition, cor-
relation analyses were conducted to explore potential
relationships between performance measures and clin-
ical variables (e.g., BIS and G-SAS) in our sample of
gambling individuals. The level of significance was set to
α = .05.
RESULTS
Demographic and clinical data are presented in Table 1.
Independent t tests did not show any significant group
differences in age: t(75) = −0.51, p = .61; impul-
siveness; t(75) = 0.79, p = .43 and education, which
was measured by the number of years completed in
schools; t(75) = −1.08, p = .28. The groups did not
differ significantly with regard to gender distribution
either, 𝜒2(1,75) = 1.51, p = .22. Most participants in the
gambling group reported gambling-related behavioural
problems in the mild (n = 23) or moderate range (n = 11),
with only one participant each falling into the extreme
and severe symptom category on the G-SAS. Four-
teen gamblers reported net losses from gambling in
everyday life (100 to 5000 Naira per week) while 21
gamblers reported net profits (100 to 10,000 Naira per
week).
Performance on the IGT
Risky decision making was examined by submitting the
number of disadvantageous decks chosen on the IGT
to a 2× 5 mixed ANOVA involving the within-subject
factor Block (1st to 5th) and the between-subjects factor
Group (gamblers vs. controls). The ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of Block, F(2.98, 223.44) = 3.88,
p = .01, ηp2 = .049, indicating that the number of cho-
sen disadvantageous decks decreased from early to
late blocks on the IGT (see Table 2). However, neither
the main effect of Group, F(1, 75) = 0.21, p = .64,
ηp2 = .003, nor the Group×Block interaction were
statistically significant, F(2.98, 223.44) = 1.32, p = .27,
ηp2 = .017. In a similar vein, net outcome on the IGT did
not differ significantly between gamblers and controls,
TABLE 2
Comparison of healthy controls and gamblers on IGT
characteristics
Controls Gamblers
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Block 1 11.24 (2.31) 11.34 (2.79)
Block 2 10.17 (2.70) 11.26 (3.18)
Block 3 10.62 (3.53) 9.89 (3.84)
Block 4 9.67 (3.71) 9.74 (4.07)
Block 5 9.67 (4.49) 10.49 (4.33)
Total risky decks 51.36 (12.18) 52.20 (13.00)
Net outcome −271.43 (634.34) −336.43 (603.91)
IGT = Iowa gambling task; SD = standard deviation.
t(75) = 0.458, p = .65. Hence, our analyses did not reveal
any substantial group differences on the IGT.
Set-shifting performance
Set-shifting was examined by submitting error rates
and mean response times on the colour-shape shifting
task to separate 2× 3 mixed ANOVAs involving the
within-subject factor Trial Type (mixed switch, mixed
repeat, single repeat) and the between-subjects factor
Group (gamblers vs. controls). Participants were only
included in these analyses if they performed significantly
better than chance (as indicated by a binomial test) on
each of the three trial types. Application of this criterion
led to the exclusion of 17 participants (10 controls and 7
gamblers).
The 2× 3 ANOVA on error rates revealed a significant
effect of Trial Type, F(1.52, 89.57) = 35.79, p< .001,
ηp2 = .378, with error rates increasing from repeat trials
in single-task blocks (4%) to repeat trials in mixed-task
blocks (12%) to switch trials in mixed-task blocks (15%;
see Figure 1). More importantly, error rates differed
significantly between groups F(1, 59) = 6.26, p = .02,
ηp2 = .096, with gamblers (13%) committing more errors
than controls (8%) on average. This group difference
was not moderated by Trial Type, F(1.52, 89.57) = 0.56,
p = .53, ηp2 = .009. With regard to response times, only
the main effect of Trial Type, F(1.24, 73.11) = 116.83,
p< .001, ηp2 = .66, but neither the main effect of
Groups, F(1, 59) = 0.90, p = .35, ηp2 = .015, nor the
Trial Type×Groups interaction, F(1.24, 73.11) = 0.44,
p = .55, ηp2 = .01, were statistically significant. Hence,
task performance was less accurate in gamblers than in
controls, but this alteration was not specific to a particular
trial type and it did not extend to the level of response
times.
Correlational analyses
Pearson correlation analyses (Tables 3 & 4) showed that
IGT performance measures (i.e., net profit and the number
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Figure 1. Accuracy and latency of participants’ responses to repeat
trials in single-task blocks (single repeat), repeat trials in mixed-task
blocks (mixed repeat) and switch trials in mixed-task blocks (mixed
switch) of the set-shifting task. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals.
of selected disadvantageous decks) were strongly corre-
lated to each other, as were error measures in the mixed
blocks of the set-shifting task. We did not observe any
substantial correlations between performance measures
and clinical variables. The correlation between G-SAS
scores and the number of errors gamblers committed on
switch trials of the set-shifting task approached statisti-
cal significance (r = −.337, p = .08), but this correlation
seems to be attributable to age being positively related to
switching errors (r = .465, p = .01) and negatively related
to G-SAS scores (r = −.379, p = .05) in our sample.
DISCUSSION
This study compared gamblers (online sports bettors) and
non-gamblers with regard to their performance on tasks
of decision making under risk and cognitive flexibility.
Contrary to findings from previous studies (Brevers et al.,
2012; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, Debeurs, & Vandenbrink,
2006), we found no significant difference in the selection
of risky decks in the IGT among the two groups. Simi-
larly, gamblers did not differ from non-gamblers in their
ability to learn from the outcome of their choices over the
course of the IGT. Gamblers committed more errors on
the set-shifting task used to assess cognitive flexibility,
but this deficit was not confined to trials requiring a task
switch. This pattern is compatible with previous studies
that found gambling-related deficits on complex flexibil-
ity tasks (such as the WCST; van Timmeren et al., 2018),
but not on more flexibility-specific measures (such as the
performance difference between switch and repeat trials
in task-switching paradigms; van Timmeren et al., 2016).
A possible explanation for the lack of a significant dif-
ference among gamblers and non-gamblers in the selec-
tion of risky decks on the IGT is that gambling-related
deficits are too small to be reliably detected given the size
of our sample. Some previous studies involving similar
sample sizes did not find statistically significant group dif-
ferences either (De Wilde, Goudriaan, Sabbe, Hulstijn, &
Dom, 2013; Linnet, Møller, Peterson, Gjedde, & Doudet,
2010), indicating that gambling-related IGT alterations
might be smaller than often assumed and that larger sam-
ples would be necessary for a reliable analysis of these
alterations. In addition, the severity of gambling might
have been too mild in our sample in order to produce
gambling-related performance deficits in cognitive tasks.
Compared to previous studies from western samples that
have examined severe to extreme gamblers (Brevers et al.,
2012), the mild gambling characteristics of our partic-
ipants as indicated in their scores in gambling assess-
ment symptoms and gambling time may explain the vari-
ance between our results and literature reported in west-
ern samples. While not being able to exclude this pos-
sibility, we did not observe IGT performance to become
worse in gamblers with high symptom scores on the
G-SAS. Nonetheless, future studies could benefit from
recruiting larger and more diverse samples, which would
allow for informative comparisons between severe, mild
and non-gamblers. These studies should also include dif-
ferent types of gambling. Compared to other types of
gambling (e.g., slot machine, roulette and black-jack),
decisions made during sports betting may be less sim-
ilar to decisions made in the IGT. Alternatively, other
decision-making tasks that are more tailored to the con-
tingencies involved in sports betting may be necessary to
detect changes in decision making in this specific popula-
tion of gamblers.
Our data suggest that the gambling population studied
here has difficulties on task-switching tasks, but that these
difficulties are not specifically related to task switching.
Compared to non-gambling controls, gamblers made
more errors when required to switch between two cog-
nitive tasks, but they also made more errors when they
had to complete the tasks separately. In other words,
it is unlikely that the performance deficits observed on
the colour-shape-shifting task results from a specific
cognitive flexibility deficit in gamblers. Instead, they
may rather be attributable to changes in general factors
that are required to perform cognitive tasks at a high
level of accuracy such as motivation, comprehension
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TABLE 3
Pearson correlations between clinical variables, IGT performance and set-shifting measures in the group of gamblers
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. BIS -
2. G-SAS .041 -
3. History −.021 .208 -
4. Net profit real life .011 −.096 −.029 -
5. Net profit IGT −.041 −.042 −.201 .093 -
6. Total risky decks −.087 −.055 .119 −.099 −.431a -
7. Error mixed switch −.005 −.337 .251 .008 .109 .241 -
8. Error mixed repeat −.211 −.069 .341 −.035 .197 .259 .766a -
9. Error single −.106 −.086 −.314 .314 .292 −.185 .050 .255 -
Note: Correlations between set-shifting measures and other variables: n = 28, correlations between set-shifting measures: n = 29, all other correlations:
n = 35. BIS = Barratt impulsiveness scale; G-SAS = Gambling symptoms assessment scale; History = history of gambling measured in years;
IGT = Iowa gambling tasks.
aCorrelation is significant at .05 level (2-tailed).
TABLE 4
Pearson correlations between impulsiveness, IGT performance, and set-shifting measures in the healthy control group
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. BIS -
2. Net profit IGT −.257 -
3. Total risky decks .141 −.542a -
4. Error mixed switch −.018 .068 .053 -
5. Error mixed repeat .176 −.096 .052 .823a -
6. Error single .175 −.141 .293 .335 .343 -
Note: Correlation between set-shifting measures and other variables: n = 32, other correlations: n = 42; BIS = Barratt impulsiveness scale; IGT = Iowa
gambling task.
aCorrelation is significant at .05 level (2-tailed).
of task instructions, or basic cognitive abilities (e.g.,
stimulus categorization). Future studies are required
to clarify whether similar processes can account for
gambling-related alterations in more complex tasks of
cognitive flexibility (van Timmeren et al., 2018) as well.
Sports betting is a relatively new form of gambling
in Nigeria, and until now, has been lawful and seen as a
recreational activity. In comparison to more established
forms of gambling activities (e.g., lotteries, pools and
casino), sport betting may be socially more acceptable
and thus attract a different type of gambler. Thus, the
conclusions of this study cannot be extended to all vari-
eties of gambling. In this context, it should also be noted
that we did not assess the possibility that our betting
participants also engaged in other types of gambling
activities. The reason for this was that aside betting, all
other forms of gambling activities are not only unpopular
but highly restricted and almost entirely illegal in Nigeria.
Future studies are needed to compare different forms and
severities of gambling to further examine the generality
of cognitive changes related to gambling and gambling
problems. Such studies are also likely to benefit from the
use of larger test batteries and samples and ideally, they
would employ longitudinal designs to assess whether
cognitive alterations predict gambling-related problems
or vice versa.
In conclusion, the present results do not support the
existence of gambling-related deficits in decision making
or cognitive flexibility in Nigerian sports bettors. While
there are many possibilities to account for these results,
they suggest that findings on the cognitive underpin-
nings of gambling cannot automatically be generalised
from Western populations to this specific gambling
context. As such, they highlight the need for systematic
cross-cultural research efforts in studying gambling and
gambling-related problems (Raylu & Oei, 2004).
All procedures performed in this were in accordance
with the ethical standards of the institutional and national
research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declara-
tion and its amendments or comparable ethical standards.
Informed consent was obtained from all individual partic-
ipants included in the study.
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